Considering Japan’s stressed economy, it should have been intolerable in terms of production and transportation to accept the loss of equipment that could have been repaired. Mechanical complexity, battle damage and environmental stresses meant that maintenance was key to an aircraft’s availability, its performance and whether the crew survived. Whether a base had been captured or built, however, it was nearly useless if seaborne supplies could not reach it. Getting fuel, food and materiel to those bases determined whether the aircraft flew. Real problems developed, however, when those units reached undeveloped territories. As Japanese forces moved south, air units occupied, repaired and exploited captured enemy bases. Zeroes, for example, underwent a thorough overhaul every 150 hours of flight. The aircraft received excellent maintenance. Plentiful quantities of fuel and spare parts were available.
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Units were at full strength in aircraft and crews. During the southern advance, the navy’s 22nd Air Flotilla supported the attack into Malaya from three airfields in and around Saigon. Japan launched its December 1941 attacks from well-developed bases. The Japanese studied and trained hard at aerial tactics, but they failed to develop the airfield construction techniques and equipment, as well as the units, necessary to build air bases, maintenance, supply and dispersal facilities. Naval air, on the other hand, was tied to operations of the Combined Fleet, with naval officers, rather than air officers, making major air decisions.Īdmiral Isoroku Yamamoto had given some thought to a land-based air war, stating in 1936 that naval operations in the next war would consist of capturing an island, building an airfield and using that base to gain control over the surrounding waters. Japan’s army had developed its air forces for continental warfare with the Soviets. Air units were subordinate to ground force commanders, not independent entities on a footing equal to ground and naval commanders. Absent such construction units, the air force would have to use captured bases.Īrmy air forces were doctrinally anachronistic. If Japan was to seize an empire, its airfield builders would have to accompany the fighting forces every step of the way. Even its short-lived lead in aerial tactics collapsed once the Guadalcanal campaign began.Ĭompletely aside from having an industrial base able to produce enough aircraft, a nation’s air force needs to be balanced between aircraft, combat and maintenance crews, and air bases.
Neither its army nor its naval air arm was prepared for the duration, violence or sophistication of the war to come. Japan, although seemingly advanced in aerial tactics, entered the war with a narrow aerial doctrine, insufficient numbers of aircraft and those of generally poor design (excluding the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, of course), too few aircrews and inadequate logistics for a war of attrition. Exchange of secrets and experiences, the common use of airplanes and other instruments, could not even be thought of.” Masataka Chihaya recalled, “ almost fought. To say that the Japanese army and navy did not cooperate on aerial matters would be a serious understatement. But as Commander Masatake Okumiya charged, “The Pacific War was started by men who did not understand the sea, and fought by men who did not understand the air.” He might well have added that the war was planned by men who did not understand industry, manpower and logistics. The Japanese made gaining and maintaining control of the air as much a requirement in their basic war strategy as they did the destruction of the U.S.
World War II in the Pacific was a fight to seize and defend airfields.
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